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We experimentally demonstrate a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol using photon pairs
entangled in orbit angular momentum (OAM). In our protocol, Alice and Bob modulate their OAM
states on each entangled pair with spatial light modulators (SLMs), respectively. Alice uses a fixed
phase hologram in her SLM, while Bob designs N different suitable phase holograms and uses them
to represent his N -based information in his SLM. With coincidences, Alice can fully retrieve the
key stream sent by Bob without information reconciliation or privacy amplification. We report the
experiment results with N = 3 and the sector states with OAM eigenmodes |` = 1〉 and |` = −1〉.
Our experiment shows that the coincidence rates are in relatively distinct value regions for the three
different key elements. Alice could recover fully Bob’s keys by the protocol. Finally, we discuss the
security of the protocol both form the light way and against the general attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Tx, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
(typically called Alice and Bob) to generate a secret key
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). It performs the
detection of any eavesdropping, and the security is guar-
anteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics,
such as, noncloning theorem and Heisenberg uncertainty
(see ref.[1] and refs. therein). QKD has attracted a great
deal of research interest since BB84 QKD protocol was
reported [2].
Up to now, there have already been several typi-
cal QKD protocols [1–8]. For example, BB84 [2], B92
[3] and SARG04 [4] protocols are nonorthogonal single-
photon protocols. E91 protocol [5], and BBM proto-
col [6] are based on entangled photons. GG02 proto-
col [7] and distributed-phase-reference (DPR) protocol
[8] are continuous-variable protocols. Currently, long-
distance QKD over 250 kilometers experiments have been
reported [9] over fiber, and secure transmission of a quan-
tum key has been performed over 144 km in free space
[10]. Meanwhile, some QKD systems have already been
commercialized [11].
Most of these QKD protocols rely on either polariza-
tion or phase of faint laser pulse as information carrier
[12], the use of polarization encoding limits the degree
of a photon to encode information. Unlike the limited
degree of freedom on polarization or phase states, orbital
angular momentum (OAM) states have attracted much
∗Electronic address: zhaosm@njupt.edu.cn
†Corresponding author:LY Gong, lygong@njupt.edu.cn
attention since there is an infinite OAM eigenstates in a
single-photon [13–18]. In 2007, Molina-Terriza et al. have
reviewed the use of OAM of photons and discussed its
potential for realizing high-dimensional quantum spaces
[14]. With the help of OAM entanglement, the group of
Kwiat has beaten the channel capacity limit for linear
photonic superdense coding [15]. In 2010, Leach et al.
demonstrated the quantum correlations in optical angle-
orbital angular momentum variables. Their experimental
results of angular EPR correlations have established that
angular position and angular momentum are suitable
variables for applications in current quantum informa-
tion processing. They also experimentally demonstrated
the violation of a Bell inequality in two and eleventh di-
mensional OAM state-space [17, 18].
Apparently, the high capacity property of OAM states
results in their applications in QKD protocol [19–21].
Recently, Gruneisen et al. proposed mutually unbi-
ased bases (MUBs) with OAM for three dimensional
quantum key distribution [20]. Malik et al. demon-
strated an experimental implementation of a free-space
11-dimensional QKD system using OAM states [21]. In
these protocols, OAM states are used to design the high-
dimensional mutually unbiased bases. They are in prin-
ciple the extension of BB84 protocol.
In this paper, we demonstrate a application for OAM
entanglement in quantum key distribution. We exper-
imentally realize a large-alphabet QKD protocol using
OAM entanglement. This QKD protocol is quite dif-
ferent from the traditional one because the protocol is
dependent on the OAM entanglement, and the security
is ensured by the property of entangled photon pairs and
the special information modulation. With the protocol,
Alice and Bob can share keys without information rec-
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2onciliation or privacy amplification. Meanwhile, there is
no classical channel in the protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we detail
the encoded states, and then present our QKD protocol.
In Sec. III, we give the experimental results that certify
our QKD protocol. In Sec. IV, we present the security
analysis of the protocol. At last, in Sec. V, we discuss
the results and draw our conclusions.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
PROTOCOL USING OAM ENTANGLEMENT
Our proposed QKD protocol is dependent on the the
encoded states. We will first introduce it in this section.
A. Encoded states
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FIG. 1: (color online) Setup for the proposed QKD scheme.
The configuration considered for the protocol is shown
in Fig. 1. The pump source is a Laguerre-Gaussian (LG)
beam, which has zero orbital angular momentum. As
OAM is conserved, the two-photon states generated from
BBO crystal by SPDC process can be represented by[13,
16–18, 22]
|Ψ〉 =
`=∞∑
`=−∞
|φ〉` =
`=∞∑
`=−∞
c` |+`〉A ⊗ |−`〉B , (1)
where subscripts A and B denote signal (Alice’s) and
idler (Bob’s) photons respectively, |c`|2 is the probabil-
ity to generate an entangled photon pairs (one photon
in signal arm with OAM +`~ and the other photon in
idler arm with OAM −`~), |`〉 is the OAM eigenmode
with mode number `, and ~ is the Plank constant divided
by 2pi. The OAM state of beam could then be changed
by a phase filter, which is implemented by computer-
controlled SLMs [23]. Here, the SLMs act as reconfig-
urable holograms. The modulated photons is collected
via a single-mode fiber (SMF) which is fed to a single
photon detector. As only the OAM eigenmodes |` = 0〉
couples into the fiber (selected only for |` = 0〉), a count
in the detector indicates a detection of the state in which
the SLM was prepared for [18], where ` is the azimuthal
index for OAM states of photons[19]. At last, the outputs
from the detectors are fed to a coincidence counter. Ex-
periments have justified that the generated two photons
are in entanglement [13, 16–18, 22]. Using the modified
Pointcare´ sphere in an analogous fashion to polarization
states, we use the sector state to encode symbol sequence
in our QKD protocol.
A sector sector state is defined as an equally weighted
superposition of |`〉 and |−`〉 with an arbitrary relative
phase, which is represented by a point along the equator
[17]
|θ`〉 =
√
2
2
(ei`θ |+`〉+ e−i`θ |−`〉), (2)
where θ relates to the orientation of the sector state in
the modified Pointcare´ sphere. Actually, it is the an-
gle between the sector state and the superposition state√
2
2 (|+`〉+ |−`〉) on the equator.
For an entangled photon pairs, the coincidence of one
photon in sector state |θA,`〉 and the other in state |θB,`〉
is [17]
C(θA,`, θB,`) =| < θA,`| < θB,`|Ψ > |2
∝ cos2 [`(θA − θB)].
(3)
The high-visibility sinusoidal fringes of this joint proba-
bility could be used for the symbol retrieving. For exam-
ple, if a |θA,`〉 is fixed for one photon at Alice’s side, and
some discrete |θB,`〉 with different angles are prepared for
the other photon at Bob’s side, the coincidence will be
different for the different angles. At the same time, if the
different angles here are the representation of different
information at Bob’s side, one could judge the different
inforamtion from the different coincidence rates at Alice’s
side. We use these sector states to encode key sequences
at Bob’s side and recover the symbol information from
the coincidence rate at Alice’s side in our proposed QKD
protocol.
B. Quantum key distribution protocol
As shown in the sketch of the setup in Fig. 1, the
regions in the left box and the right box are Alice’s
and Bob’s private places in our protocol, respectively.
Based on the configuration and the sector states shown
in Eq.(2), the proposed QKD protocol is designed as fol-
lows.
(1) With BBO crystal, Alice generates entangled pho-
ton pairs, named signal photons and idler photons. Alice
keeps the signal photons for herself and sends the idler
photons in the free-space channel to Bob.
(2) Alice selects a sector state |θA,`〉 for the signal
photons. Here, the sector state is implemented by a
computer-controlled SLMA with a special hologram in
combination with SMF on the signal photons.
3(3) At the same time, Bob will encode his symbol se-
quence with his sector states. He also selects the sector
states using SLMB with different phase holograms in
combination with SMF on the idler photons. The cor-
responding sector states are
∣∣∣θ0B,`〉 , ∣∣∣θ1B,`〉 , ..., ∣∣∣θN−1B,` 〉,
which are codes for key elements“0”,“1”,...,“N − 1”, re-
spectively. For a stream of key elements, Bob successively
chooses the corresponding phase hologram and modulate
them in his SLM. For each key element, the correspond-
ing modulation continues for a regular time interval τ for
enough coincidence counting. Of course, if the detectors
have high enough detection efficiency, the regular time
interval is not needed.
(4) Alice and Bob transmit the modulated photons to
the detectors DA and D
′
A at Alice’s private place through
a single mode fiber, respectively.
(5) Alice performs a coincidence measurement at her
site. According to the different coincidence rates, Alice
can retrieve the key sequences prepared by Bob, so that
they could share the same keys. Note that the suitable
modulations for Bob in the 3rd step, mean that in the
5th step, the corresponding coincidences expressed in
Eq.(3) are in distinct value regions.
On the other hand, in the above 1—5 steps, Alice and
Bob replace each other, then Bob can recover keys sent
by Alice. In other words, if there are two such setups,
Alice and Bob can send keys to each other.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to testify this protocol by experiment, we
setup an experimental system as Fig. 2, where a quasi
continuous-wave, mode-locked (100MHz) 355nm laser is
selected as the pump source. It is focused into a nonlin-
ear crystal [β-barium borate (BBO)], which can generate
OAM entangled photons through a frequency-degenerate
type-I spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC)
process. The spatial light modulator are the product
from Hamamatsu Photonics. The modulated photons is
collected via a single-mode fiber (SMF) with 5um. The
single photon detectors are the detection modules from
Perkin Elmer. The interference filters selected are at
710nm with 10nm bandwidth (Thorslab product). In
addition, some lens are used to illustrate the beam path
is long enough in free space. Finally, The outputs from
the detector modules are fed to a self-made coincidence
counter. In order to implement the experiment, we let
the two side (Alice and Bob) be symmetric. The detail
of the experimental setup is shown as Fig. 2.
To verify the above protocol, we give experimental re-
sults at N = 3 and the sector states in Eq.(2) with
` = 1. In the 3rd step of the protocol, we set the
regular time interval τ = 1000ms , which guarantees
to produce no less than 500 entangled photon pairs in
the time interval. Henceforth, we omit ` for simplic-
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FIG. 2: (color online) Setup for the proposed QKD scheme.
BBO:BaB2O4 nonlinear crystals; SLMA:spatial light modu-
lator for Signal photons; SLMB :spatial light modulator for
idler photons; SMF:single mode fiber; DA:detector for signal
photons; DA′ :detector for idler photons. In our protocol, the
upper box and the lower box are Alice’s and Bob’s private
places, respectively.
ity. We choose
∣∣θA = pi2 〉, ∣∣θ0B = 0〉, ∣∣θ1B = pi4 〉, ∣∣θ2B = pi2 〉.
From Eq.(3), C(θA =
pi
2 , θ
0
B = 0) is relatively small,
C(θA =
pi
2 , θ
1
B =
pi
4 ) is middle, and C(θA =
pi
2 , θ
2
B =
pi
2 ) is
relatively large.
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FIG. 3: (color online) The relative coincidences vary with the
reduced time for key elements“0”,“1” and “2”, respectively.
In Fig.3, we show the relative coincidences versus the
reduced time , which are for 100 successive keys from a
key stream with length 10000. Here the relative coinci-
dence is the ratio of photon coincidence counting during
τ to the maximal counting 561 in our experiment, and
the reduced time is the real time divided by τ . We find
that the relative coincidences are near zero for the key el-
ement “0”, near one for the key element “2”, and around
one-half for the key element “1”, which agrees with the
calculated results from Eq.(3).
In Fig.4, we give the probability of relative coinci-
dences for key elements “0”, “1” and “2”, as a statis-
tic result from an experiment containing 10000 keys. It
shows that they all obey Gaussian distribution due to
the Gaussian noise of light sources. For key elements
4TABLE I: the partial experiment results and corresponding keys at ` = 1
Bob’s key 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1
θB 0
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2
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2
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2
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2
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2
pi
2
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2
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coincidence 4 291 260 506 493 287 18 479 14 280 19 528 293
Relative coincidence 0.007 0.519 0.464 0.902 0.879 0.512 0.032 0.854 0.025 0.499 0.034 0.941 0.522
key recovered by Alice 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1
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FIG. 4: (color online) The probability of relative coincidences
for key elements“0”,“1” and “2”, respectively. The curves are
corresponding Gaussian fits.
“0”,“1” and “2”, the values of relative coincidences are
in the ranges [0, 0.05], [0.40, 0.57] and [0.70, 1.0], respec-
tively. There are large enough gaps between arbitrary
two nearest ranges. In other words, the coincidence rates
are in distinct value regions for different key elements.
Therefore, Alice can judge the key element sent by Bob
according to which region the value of the coincidence
rate belongs to, i.e., Alice can recover Bob’s keys. To
test this, we let Bob send another 10000 keys in exper-
iments. We find that Alice can fully recover Bob’s keys
with the decision criteria. The corresponding partial ex-
perimental results are illustrated in Table I.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Next, we will present our argument about the security
of our QKD protocol from two aspects. One aspect is the
security at the light way, and the other is the security
against typical attacks.
A. Security at the light way
In the protocol, Alice generates the signal and idler
photons from BBO crystal by SPDC. Then, Alice mod-
ulates a fixed phase on the photons in order to select
special OAM states from the superposition of all OAM
states from ` = −∞ to ` = ∞. The modulated photons
travel in SMF. Last, Alice take coincident measurement
and extract the key from the measurements. As shown
in the left box in Fig.1, all these happen in Alice’s site.
During all the procedures, Eve can not access the signal
photons. Therefore, the signal photons are safe.
As shown in the right box in Fig.1, Bob modulate the
idler photons in his site. Eve can not access the idler
photons during Bob’s modulation. They are safe at the
above procedure.
There are two chances for Eve to access the idler pho-
tons when idler photons travel in public quantum chan-
nels. As displayed in Fig.1, one chance is when the idler
photons are transmitted from Alice to Bob in free spaces
after Alice generates the OAM entangled photons. The
other is when the idler photons are transmitted from
Bob’s private place to Alice’s site in SMF after Bob
modulates his information. For simplicity, we call the
two chances the ATB chance and the BTA change, re-
spectively. For the ATB chance, at that time, the state
carried by idler photons is a superposition of all OAM
states and does not have Bob’s information. Further-
more, the idler photons are entangled with the signal
photons. Hence, even Eve accesses these photons, she
can not steal any Bob’s information from the idler pho-
ton. Actually, Alice could detect this action since she
keep the other entangled photon. For the BTA chance,
there is only |` = 0〉 mode in the idler photons when they
travel in SMF, and |` = 0〉 mode has no key information
in Bob’s encoding scheme. As entangled photon pairs are
used in our protocol, Bob’s information can be recovered
only using coincidence measurement between idler and
signal photons. However, in our protocol, Eve has no
change to access signal photons , therefore, she also can
not get any Bob’s key information at the procedure.
From all the above, we find that Eve can not get Bob’s
key information for all the light way. Furthermore, the
photon losses are unavoidable when photons travel in
light ways nearly for all systems. Here Alice (Bob) re-
covers a key sent by Bob (Alice) using coincidence mea-
surements. The corresponding coincidence counting rate
is a statistical result, therefore, the value of key can also
be recovered even at the condition that small fraction of
photons loss.
B. Security against typical attacks
During QKD, there are many eavesdropping strategies
for Eve to get key information. The typical attacks are
the intercept-resend (IR) attack, the man-in-the-middle
5(MIRM) attack, and the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack, et. al. Eve can perform these attacks in the ATB
chance or the BTA chance that mentioned above. In the
following, we analysis them respectively.
(i)The IR attack: Eve measures out every signal emit-
ted by Alice and prepares a new one, depending on the
result obtained, that is given to Bob. As described above,
in the ATB and the BTA chances, there is no difference
between these idler photons. Eve can intercept and mea-
sure them. However, there is no meaning for these mea-
surement results. Therefore, Eve can not get any key
information. As entangled photon pairs are used, the
photon resent by Eve will not satisfied with Eq.(3), so
Alice can detect the eavesdropper.
(ii)The MIRM attack: Eve pretends to be Bob to Alice
and simultaneously pretends to be Alice to Bob. QKD is
vulnerable to this attack when used without authentica-
tion. In our protocol, Alice (Bob) can fully recover Bob’s
(Alice’s) keys. They can also send deterministic keys to
each other. If Alice and Bob have an initial shared secret,
they can use these deterministic keys to authenticate each
other.
(iii)The PNS attack: Weak pulses may contain more
than one photon and Eve can simply keep some of the
photons while letting the others go to Bob. In our proto-
col, many photons in a regular time interval τ generate a
qudit, which is equivalent to the many-photon case. Eve
can keep some of the photons while let the others go to
Bob during one τ . As entangled photon pairs and sec-
tor states are used, Eve can’t get key information carried
by photons for she has no chance to perform coincidence
measurements.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the paper, we have experimentally demonstrated
the proposed large-alphabet QKD protocol with the
entangled-photon in Bob’s side carrying trits of infor-
mation. Theoretically, Bob uses OAM as information
carrier, so that he can encode more than one bits on his
key sequences every time. We have analyzed the security
of the protocol both from the light way and the typical
attacks. The results show that the security of the proto-
col is ensured by the property of the entangled photons
and the special fashion of the information modulation.
The experimental results also show that Alice could re-
cover fully Bob’s information, so that Alice and Bob can
share keys without information reconciliation or privacy
amplification.
In principle, our QKD protocol have some advantages
over the traditional QKD protocols. First, we use OAM
states as the information carrier, there is in principle
no limit to how many bits encoded in each entangled
photon pairs, which results in a potentially very large-
alphabet size. Second, we utilize the entangled photons
and the special fashion of the information modulation
in the protocol, and recover the key sequences by co-
incidence counting. Since one photon is always kept in
Alice’s private space, Eve has no way to eavesdrop the
key sequences during the protocol steps. All these as-
sure the security of our proposed protocol. In addition,
in the protocol, Alice and Bob do not need any classical
communications for the key recovery, which makes the
protocol efficient and simple.
In practice, the bits encoded in each entangled pho-
ton pairs is determined by the light source properties,
noise intensity and the photon detection to distinguish
the corresponding coincidences expressed in Eq.(3). Ex-
perimentally, we could recover four-based keys with the
distinct coincidences if we set the regular time interval
τ = 200ms so that more than 100 entangled photon pairs
could be produced during the time interval. Hence, we
got 5 four-based keys per second with 10 bits per sec-
ond (bps) at this case. Currently, the coincidence rate
is in the order 102 to 104 counts per second using dif-
ferent entangled photon sources, and the corresponding
key generation rates are in the order 10 to 103 bps with
our QKD. This is slower than QKD technologies based
on weak coherent pulses. But, with the development of
techniques about the photon detection and the genera-
tion of entangled photon pairs, the key generation rate
will be improved greatly.
Generally, the practical implementing of QKD based
on OAM states will confront two big problems, such as,
decoherence by atmospheric turbulence and photon losses
in quantum channel. Theoretically and experimentally,
these two problems have been attracted a lot of atten-
tion [24, 25], and some solutions have been proposed to
overcome these problems [26, 27].
Finally, as the keys can be recovered completely, the
protocol can also be used to quantum authentication,
quantum direct communication [28–30] and so on.
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